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In this increasingly multipolar world, many countries are pursuing context-specific coalitions to ensure their sovereignty and security. Global South countries are asserting their national interests, calling out the double standards of international organizations, and cooperating in areas of mutual gain while competing in other realms. However, advocates of the Western-dominated multilateral system doubt that these emerging Global South powers can build a more fit-for-purpose, equitable, and foresighted era of international cooperation.
Even as great power competition remains a major force in international politics, new rules and players are emerging. New technologies from social media to cheap military drones — all turbocharged with AI — are leveling the playing field. Many Global South countries are eschewing rigid groupthink blocs to pursue multi-aligned foreign policy, balancing context- and interest-specific relationships.
For instance, many Western allies, like NATO-member Türkiye, Israel, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, did not support Western sanctions against Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. Similarly, despite repeated prodding by the United States, its NATO allies have not yet sent their militaries to aid the U.S.-Israel war on Iran. Intense debate has erupted within and between the United States’ Gulf partners about the war. That debate may have been the last straw that pushed the long-disgruntled UAE to exit the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Amid its declining global influence, in early 2025, the European Union presented its plan to reinvigorate Europe's economy, aimed at improving innovation and reducing dependencies while decarbonizing its economy to “secure its prosperity.” It is expanding its portfolio of trade agreements, especially with developing economies such as India, Indonesia, Mexico, and the South American trading bloc Mercosur. In parallel, it has doubled down on its protectionist carbon tax on imports of iron, steel, cement, aluminum, and fertilizers, while investing almost a trillion euros in military and defense to “ReArm Europe” by 2030.
For its part, the United States has remained resolute about its “America First” agenda. For example, over the past 16 months, Washington has shuttered its development aid agency, left 66 international bodies including the World Health Organization, exited the Paris Agreement for the second time, launched tariff wars on friends and foes, threatened to “obtain” Greenland, blockaded Cuba, kidnapped Venezuela’s president, and started a war with Iran.
Signaling its disinterest in international economic cooperation, once central to its foreign policy, the United States has listed only three domestic priorities for its 2026 G20 presidency: removing regulatory burdens, unlocking energy independence and abundance, and promoting AI and emerging technology innovations. It has cast aside the unanimous outcomes of the preceding four presidencies — led by Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa — covering debt, development, decarbonization, and disaster risks, which impact billions of people in the Global South.
Shifts in the System
Such changes to the international system have butterfly effects that will shape the future of multilateral systems and, significantly, the United States role and influence in the world. Three events on May 14, 2026, illustrate these ripple effects.
In Beijing on May 14, U.S. President Donald Trump met Chinese President Xi Jinping even as the U.S.-Iran war wreaked havoc on the global economy and disrupted China’s supply of low-cost Iranian crude. Heightened friction and the ongoing bitter tariff war overwhelmed the visit's trade potential, despite the U.S. side including leading technology and business chiefs. China yielded little and reasserted its red line on Taiwan. At the same time, a U.S. statement noted that “President Xi also made clear China’s opposition to the militarization of the Strait [of Hormuz],” which, ironically, also undermined the United States’ own military blockade. Headlines hyping the visit shifted to trash cans overflowing with Chinese gifts discarded by the U.S. delegation, demonstrating distrust and disdain.
Also on May 14, BRICS+ foreign ministers met in New Delhi, including those from Iran and the UAE, despite the open war between the two countries. The group agreed to disagree about the war, and was unanimous on matters of socioeconomic progress, global governance, and multipolarity. As of this writing, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan will attend the BRICS Summit in New Delhi in September 2026. This pragmatism — which many Global South countries often employ — helps balance the immediate with the longer-term, preserving space for trust and cooperation even when at extreme odds.
Meanwhile, in Moscow on May 14, the BRICS-led New Development Bank (NDB) held its annual meeting, focusing on creating a strategy to blend traditional financial instruments with digital solutions to accelerate settlements and create a new financing channel that could compete with Western-led reserve currency and payment systems. The NDB aims to be the key financier of the Global South and offers local currency loans without imposing policy constraints on borrowers, which is vital for debt-distressed developing countries locked out of multilateral banking. Also rising are BRICS’ direct foreign grants, loans, and investments, such as China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative, India-led multilaterals such as International Solar Alliance and Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure, and the UAE’s Abu Dhabi Fund for Development.
On the one hand, the United States is withdrawing from the multilateral system it created; on the other, a new matrix of multilateralism is emerging, with new approaches and technologies aimed at addressing the distortions and inequities of the past system and advancing Global South interests.
At the bloc level, the BRICS+ consensus matters, as its members represent almost half the world’s population and account for 40% of global GDP by Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) and 26% of global trade. By contrast, the G7’s share of GDP by PPP has dropped to about 30% from a high of 45% in 1992. Intra-BRICS trade, often using local currencies and bilateral systems, has grown 13 times since 2003, with non-dollar trade crossing the equivalent of USD $1 trillion in 2024 (of total $33 trillion global trade). International Monetary Fund data shows the dollar’s share of global foreign reserves at about 57% in 2025, down from 72% in 2001, and notes that the share of “currencies not separately identified” has doubled since 2021 to approximately 6% (over 8% with China’s renminbi).
These shifts are partly due to BRICS steadily building its own capacities and systems despite the widely varying, often contradictory, priorities and capabilities of its member countries. In an important signal of political solidarity, BRICS heads of state or government have met every single year in formal annual summits since their inaugural gathering in 2009, despite bilateral complexities, which has helped avert major conflicts.
The Global South Looks for New Alternatives
More revealing than such big data are the small but steady shifts in attitudes and processes of Global South countries seeking multipolar options.
Punitive tariffs, non-tariff protectionism, and sanctions are propelling Global South countries to build their own technology platforms and partnerships. Western sanctions on Russia weaponized ostensibly neutral systems such as SWIFT, foreign reserves, and common software, alarming other countries that use them. Russia has stabilized using non-Western channels, and alternatives like China’s renminbi-based Cross-Border Interbank Payment System are gaining ground. A landmark case of German tech giant SAP halting critical software access for Indian refinery Nayara because of its ties to EU-sanctioned Russian oil giant Rosneft has spurred India to hasten its foundational tech localization.
Hard power remains important, but long-term alliances need to rest on shared interests and values, diplomacy, and people-to-people connections. The United States is right to call for a balance of trade, but should find countries with complementary goods and services, instead of imposing arbitrary tariffs. Its civilian and military technologies and innovations will yield limited gains if restricted to Americans in today’s hyperconnected world. America’s soft power will continue to erode, much like Europe’s has, if it keeps operating under the assumption that it still holds all the cards.
Policymakers in the United States should realize that post-World War II multilateralism is fading and the Global South is building a new international order on its own terms, and increasingly, with its own resources. The United States, too, must find its place in this new, and contested, world order.
First, though, Washington must accept that for the rest of the world, it is not “America First.”
