Blog

Who Decides What is Legitimate in Global Governance?

July 7, 2026
5 min
Portrait of Madison Harris
Madison Harris
Who Decides What is Legitimate in Global Governance?

Global Governance and World Order

For the first time in a decade, the United Nations is choosing a new secretary-general — and for the first time in its 80-year history, a woman has a real shot at the job. Whoever wins will inherit an institution squeezed by financial insolvency, a deadlocked Security Council, and a deepening credibility crisis.

“Multilateral institutions continue to organize important dimensions of global life. Yet their political legitimacy is increasingly questionable,” Marta Fernández, the director of the BRICS Policy Center and an associate professor at Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, said at a Global South Policy Hub (GSPH) roundtable in June. The discussion brought together experts from across the Global South and U.S. congressional staffers to examine how the international order is shifting amid great power competition, rising multipolarity, and declining trust in legacy institutions.

A Familiar Double Standard

The rules of the global order have always been presented as universal but applied inequitably to Global North and Global South countries. In this sense, today’s legitimacy deficit is nothing new. But, in the past few years, this double standard has become impossible to ignore for the Global North.

During COVID-19, India and South Africa requested a temporary waiver on intellectual property rights from the World Trade Organization to accelerate vaccine rollout. However, it was blocked by a small number of high-income countries, including the United States.

The Global North swiftly condemned Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and responded with a coordinated sanctions campaign and multi-faceted support for Kyiv. In contrast, the Global North was hesitant to condemn Israel's violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza in retaliation for Hamas’s October 7 terrorist attack.

“Rules should apply to all or they should not [apply to all],” said Shuva Raha, a GSPH nonresident fellow.

These events and others like them have had a clear effect on the Global South’s perceptions of the United States. A recent Körber-Stiftung survey found that 60% of South African respondents view U.S. global influence negatively, compared to 73% who view China positively. Eighty-three percent believe the Global North has lost credibility as a defender of global norms.

Reform From Inside, Build Outside

Still, Global South countries are not completely rejecting traditional multilateral institutions. Instead, they are seeking to expand them, pushing for reform inside these legacy institutions while also building new systems. These new institutions are designed to coexist with the existing ones, and to fill the gaps where reforming traditional institutions has stalled. In fact, the BRICS’s Contingent Reserve Arrangement requires an International Monetary Fund program if a member state intends to borrow more than 30% of the maximum drawing limit.

BRICS is a group comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa that has now expanded to 11 Global South members. It functions as a political and diplomatic forum for Global South countries. The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement provides mutual support among BRICS banks during sudden currency crises.

Additionally, regional frameworks like the African Continental Free Trade Area are growing as intra-continental trade becomes a viable alternative to dependence on external markets. These initiatives are expanding participation and increasing global political space for the Global South.

Why This Should Matter to Washington

This is not just a Global South concern. A more representative system and stability in the Global South prevent concrete costs for the United States through disrupted supply chains, climate-induced displacement, and ceded strategic influence.

The United States’ frequent use of coercive tools such as sanctions and tariffs has only accelerated Global South efforts to form alternative institutions and to move away from reliance on the U.S. dollar, also known as de-dollarization.

“When [U.S. President] Trump said that if BRICS de-dollarized, he will put 100% tariffs on BRICS, this automatically [made] BRICS countries think that they have to protect themselves, trying to go to alternative currencies,” Fernández said.

In this era of U.S. retrenchment, characterized by the country’s disengagement from reform efforts, momentum for alternative institutions will grow. Eventually, the United States may find itself in a fragmented system that even its Global North allies have drifted away from.

The Next United Nations Secretary-General

Efforts to reform the United Nations today are driven by where money is cut rather than by a clear, strategic vision. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres acknowledged that staff vacancies “do not correspond to a strategic priority,” but rather to the lack of budget to replace staff who have left the institution. Reforms should be specific and target institutions that are failing to enforce rules, rather than diffusing accountability across “the system” in the abstract, according to Raha.

Appointing a woman as the next United Nations secretary-general is a clear example of the representational reform the institution claims to champion. “After eight decades with no woman as secretary-general, if you are talking about legitimacy, representation, and inclusivity, this is a very symbolic gesture,” Sidiropoulos said.

The test of whether the rules-based order can adapt is playing out in real time as the international community will soon select the next U.N. leader and as the United States chooses how to engage with them.

More Publications